Do Campaign Contributions from Farmers Influence Agricultural Policy? Evidence From a 2008 Farm Bill Amendment Vote to Curtail Cotton Subsidies

Scott Callahan

No 18-08, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: Farmers in the United States receive billions of dollars per year from federal farm support programs. While the nature of these programs has evolved since the Great Depression, they both persist and expand with the passage of every farm bill. This paper studies the political activities of individual farmers and the political action committees that represent their interests by exploiting a vote to amend the 2008 farm bill that, had it passed, would have curtailed a cotton subsidy program. I find evidence that cotton farmers contribute substantially to campaigns in the House of Representatives. The more a cotton farmer receives in farm subsidies, the more likely they are to make political contributions. Further, there is evidence that cotton farmers contribute substantially to non-local races, and that these contribution patterns closely resemble those of cotton political action committees. Results on the effectiveness of these contributions in influencing legislative outcomes is inconclusive. Key Words: Agricultural Policy, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, Campaign Finance

JEL-codes: D72 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-08

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