Campaign Contributions Made by Farmers: Does Geography Affect Behavior?

Scott Callahan

No 18-11, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: This essay contains a reduced form analysis of campaign contributions made by subsidy receiving farmers, in order to better understand if contribution strategies for campaigns in the House of Representatives by individual farmers differ based on whether or not the candidate represents their local congressional district, a non-local congressional district within the donor?s state, or an out of state congressional district. This is accomplished by applying a Tobit model to a panel of contributions, recording zero values of farmers in a given congressional district contribute nothing to a given legislator. Results indicate that farmers appear to contribute heavily to local campaigns regardless of the power of the legislator to influence agricultural legislation, while the ability of legislators to influence agricultural legislation becomes a more important driver of campaign contributions in more distant elections. Key Words: Agricultural Policy, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, Campaign Finance

JEL-codes: D72 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-11

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