Endogenous stackelberg leadership: the symmetric case

Pedro Jara-Moroni

FAE-USACH Working Papers Series from Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile

Abstract: In this article we prove that, when firms are identical, there are no non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibria in the linear quantity setting duopoly game studied by van Damme and Hurkens (1999) , in which firms engage in the “Action Commitment Game” proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The consequence of this is that in the symmetric case, there can not be equilibrium selection through risk dominance in such game

Keywords: Stackelberg; Cournot; Endogenous Timing; Mixed Strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ars:papers:991943756506116

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