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The role of endogenous payoff over public coordination equilibrium

Pedro Jara-Moroni and Benjamín Matta Serrano ()
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Benjamín Matta Serrano: Facultad de Administración y Economía.Universidad de Santiago de Chile

FAE-USACH Working Papers Series from Facultad de Administración y Economía. Universidad de Santiago de Chile

Abstract: This paper studies how the threat of a protest influences government spending. The government has to choose a policy to maximize its payoff, which depends on (1) the policy itself and (2) the protest’s outcome. Citizens observe the policy choice and a private signal before deciding simultaneously whether to protest. We provide an equilibrium in which citizens coordinate only in public information, and show that if, in addition to the protest’s outcome, the payoff of the government depends on its size, the set of equilibrium strategies is a proper subset. Classification-JEL D7, D83, C72

Keywords: Protest game; Global game; Public information; Social Movements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2023-12-12, Revised 2023-12-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in FAE USACH - Working Papers Series, Número 2, Marzo 2023

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ars:papers:992098739606116

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