CHINESE LISTED PROPERTY COMPANIES ENGAGED IN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT?

Qiulin Ke and Robert Edelstein

ERES from European Real Estate Society (ERES)

Abstract: Corporate earnings management may generate serious market impacts by misleading investors and causing the misallocation of resources. Our paper represents one of the first comprehensive analyses of earnings management for Chinese listed property companies. Using data from 2001-2008, we examine the earnings management activities of Chinese listed property companies. We investigate the incentives of companies to manage earnings and other real activities. We show that Chinese listed property companies are more likely to engage in earnings management in order to meet regulatory requirements for issuing new shares or avoiding de-listing. We also find ownership concentration facilitates earnings management. The existence of other large outside shareholders and independent directors reduces the likelihood of earnings management. Earnings management is more likely to occur in companies where the Chair and the CEO appear to be entrenched. Inventorying and current liabilities can be utilized to manage earnings to meet short-term financial targets.

JEL-codes: R3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2010_171

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