REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT TIE-BREAKING RULES
Tommaso Gabrieli () and
Gianluca Marcato ()
ERES from European Real Estate Society (ERES)
This paper contributes to a novel and fast growing literature which introduces game theory in the analysis of real options investments in competitive settings. Specifically, in this paper we focus on the issue of multiple equilibria and on the implications that different equilibrium selections may have for the valuation of real options and the investment strategies. We present some theoretical results on the conditions for multiple equilibria. We apply our analysis to the valuation of a real estate development in South London.
JEL-codes: R3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Real Options and Game Theoretical Approaches to Real Estate Development Projects: Multiple Equilibria and the Implications of Different Tie-Breaking Rules (2009)
Working Paper: Real Options and Game Theoretical Approaches to Real Estate Development Projects: Multiple Equilibria and the Implications of Different Tie-Breaking Rules
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2010_294
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ERES from European Real Estate Society (ERES) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Architexturez Imprints ().