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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance

Michael Keane () and Olena Stavrunova ()

No 201119, Working Papers from ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR), Australian School of Business, University of New South Wales

Abstract: The size of adverse selection and moral hazard eects in health insurance markets has important policy implications. For example, if adverse selection eects are small while moral hazard eects are large, conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory insurance enrolment) may lead to substantial increases in health care spending. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the magnitudes of adverse selection vs. moral hazard. This paper sheds new light on this important topic by studying the US Medigap (supplemental) health insurance market.

Keywords: Health insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard; health care expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C34 C35 D82 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 80 pages
Date: 2011-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Demand for Medigap Insurance (2010) Downloads
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