Does Affirmative Action in Politics Hinder Performance? Evidence from India

Sabyasachi Das and Rajas Saroy ()
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Rajas Saroy: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay

No 3, Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine how performance of elected representatives, as measured by delivery of public goods, is affected by affirmative action in elections, i.e., imposing quota in elections for one population group. We show both theoretically and empirically, using randomized electoral quotas for a caste group (OBCs) in India, that when group identities are salient and group sizes are asymmetric, affirmative action may in fact increase electoral competition and consequently, improve leader’s performance. The result challenges the notion that equity promotion must necessarily come at the cost of “efficiency.†It further justiï¬ es the electoral quota policy in India of targeting the jurisdictions where the group is numerous.

Keywords: Electoral; competition; Gram; Panchayat; Public; goods; Reservation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63
Date: 2018-08-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does affirmative action in politics hinder performance? Evidence from India (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ash:wpaper:03

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