Dominant Strategy Implementation in a Large Population Public Goods Game

Ratul Lahkar () and Saptarshi Mukherjee ()
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Saptarshi Mukherjee: IIT, Delhi

No 36, Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider implementation of the efficient state in a large population public goods game. Agents are divided into a finite set of types. The planner asks agents to report types, which generates a reported type distribution. Based on reported types and distribution, the planner calculates the efficient strategy level and a Pigouvian transfer for each type of agent. We show that this direct mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility in strictly dominant strategies, strong budget balance and ex–post individual rationality.

Keywords: Externalities; Pigouvian; Pricing; Public; goods; VCG; Mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 09
Date: 2020-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Forthcoming, Economic Letters

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Journal Article: Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game (2020)
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