Affirmative Action in Large Population Contests
Ratul Lahkar () and
Rezina Sultana ()
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Rezina Sultana: IIM, Udaipur
No 40, Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics
We consider affirmative action in large population Tullock contests. The standard Tullock contest is an equal treatment contest in which agents who exert equal effort have an equal probability of success. In contrast, under affirmative action, agents with equal cost of effort have equal probability of success. We analyze such contests as generalized aggregative potential games and characterize their Nash equilibria. We show that affirmative action equalizes equilibrium payoffs without causing any loss of aggregate welfare. It enhances the welfare and effort levels of agents facing high effort cost. Thus, affirmative action engenders equality without having any detrimental effects on efficiency, at least when the number of agents involved are large. It does, however, reduce aggregate effort in society.
Keywords: Affirmative Action, Tullock Contests; Aggregative Games; Potential Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-isf
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ash:wpaper:40
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