Generalized Perturbed Best Response Dynamics with a Continuum of Strategies

Ratul Lahkar (), Sayan Mukherjee () and Souvik Roy ()
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Sayan Mukherjee: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Souvik Roy: Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata

No 51, Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a generalization of perturbed best response dynamics in population games with a continuum of strategies. The previous literature has considered the logit dynamic generated through the Shannon entropy as a deterministic perturbation. We consider a wider class of deterministic perturbations satisfying lower semicontinuity and strong convexity. Apart from the Shannon entropy, Tsallis entropy and Burg entropy are other perturbations that satisfy these conditions. We thereby generate the generalized perturbed best response dynamic with a continuum of strategies. We establish fundamental properties of the dynamic and show convergence in potential games and negative semidefinite games.

Keywords: Logit; Dynamic; Negative; Semidefinite; Games; Perturbed; Best; Response; Potential; Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2021-02-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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