Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT
Kyle Bagwell and
Robert Staiger ()
No 6, Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
JEL-codes: F02 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:19996
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