Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions

Sushil Bikhchandani, Philip Haile and John Riley

No 17R, Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Journal Article: Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:200017r

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