Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

James Andreoni and Emily Blanchard

No 15, Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games (2006)
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