Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment

James Andreoni, Yeon-Koo Che and J. Kim
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J. Kim: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute

No 6, Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-fmk, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment (2007)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (2006)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:20066

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