EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY FINITE AUTOMATA

K. Binmore and Larry Samuelson

Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Keywords: profit; decision making; stategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1990
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Working Paper: Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata (1991)
Working Paper: Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:90-29

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