A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson

Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Abstract: In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers, with private information about their type, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follows Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process.

Keywords: GAMES; INFORMATION; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D80 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets (1997)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets (1996)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets (1995)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection In Signaling Markets
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:9518r

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ailsenne Sumwalt ().