Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case

Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger

Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Abstract: why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT? With existing arguments, it is possible to understand GATT's restrictions on export subsidies as representing an inefficient victory of the interests of exporting governments over the interests of importing governments. However, to our knowledge, there does not exist a formal theoretical treatment that provides circumstances under which GATT's restrictions on export subsidies can be given a world-wide efficiency rational. In this paper, we offer one such treatment in the context of a natural monopoly market

Keywords: INTERNATIONAL TRADE; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; MONOPOLIES; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic export subsidies and reciprocal trade agreements: The natural monopoly case (1997)
Working Paper: Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case (1996)
Working Paper: Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:9605

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