Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model

I. Eshel, Larry Samuelson and A. Shaked

Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Abstract: We study a population of agents , each of whome can be an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruism is a strictly dominated strategy. Agent choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs. Interactions between agents are local, so that each agent affects (and is affected by) only his neighbors.

Keywords: ALTRUISM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Working Paper: Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:9612r

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