Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences

D.B. Colom

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on single-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good).

Keywords: PUBLIC GOODS; GAMES; VOTING; POLITICS; MATHEMATICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:333.96

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