Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

G. Biglaiser and Ching-to Ma

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regular cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; REGULATION; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 K20 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1999)
Working Paper: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1996)
Working Paper: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:340.96

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