Managerial Reputation and Bad Acquisitions: A Note

Juan Reboredo

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: Managerial reputation could induce managers to make mixed blessing acquisitions for shareholders. From a managerail ability learning model, we show that managers' acquisitions may reduce the firm's solvency unless the acquisition return first-degree stochastic dominates the alternative action return.

Keywords: MANAGEMENT; ACQUISITIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:381.97

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