An Explicit Bound On epsilon for Non-Emptiness of the epsilon-Core of an Arbitrary Game Without Side Payments

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a)the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this approximation; (b) the size of approximately effective small groups; (c) the size of the bound on maximal per capita payoffs achievable in coalitions; and (d) a measure on the extent to which the payoff sets of the game are bounded away from being "flat".

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:394.97

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