Time-Consistent Protection With Learning by Doing

Eugenio Miravete ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper studies whether it is possible to characterize an optimal, time-consistent tariff to protect an infant-industry in the presence of learning effects. A domestic monopolist decides how much to produce, taking into account learning effects induced by its current production, while the governemnt decides on the level of tariff protection. In order to ensure time consistency and characterize the optimal policy i solve the case where learning leads to lower fixed costs..

Keywords: GAME THEORY; TRADE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Time-consistent protection with learning by doing (2003)
Working Paper: Time-Consistent Protection with Learning by Doing (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:395.97

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