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Bribes for Faster Delivery

Amal Sanyal

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services in third world countries. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision, and secondly, by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution eludes the problem because no hard evidence of the reduction of corruption can be established for this type of offenses. It is also shown that using more than one supplier cannot eliminate the practice, and the bribe paying part of the market attains a determinate proportion as the number of suppliers increases. However the bribe rate and average waiting time come down at a diminishing rate with increase in the number of suppliers, and this property can be used to determine an optimal number of suppliers.

Keywords: third world; queues; corruption; bribes; optimal mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 H8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2000-12-15
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:474.00

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