The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Kaniska Dam and David Perez-Castrillo

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Keywords: Principal-agent; Moral hazard; Matching; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2001-11-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Principal-Agent Matching Market (2006)
Working Paper: The principal-agent matching market (2006)
Working Paper: The Principal-Agent Matching Market (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:503.01

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