Voting by Committees with Exit

Dolors Berga, Gustavo Berganti?s, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gustavo Bergantiños

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; voting; stability; and committees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2002-05-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:511.02

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