Learning from Errors

Juan Enrique Martinez-Legaz and Antoine Soubeyran

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We present a model of learning in which agents learn from errors. If an action turns out to be an error, the agent rejects not only that action but also neighboring actions. We find that, keepng memory of his errors, under mild assumptions an acceptable solution is asymptotically reached. Moreover, one can take advantage of big errors for a faster learning.

Keywords: Learning; errors; fixed points; normal form games; best reply functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2003-01-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:557.03

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