Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem

Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Keywords: Bribe-proofness; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Replacement Monotonicity; Single-peakedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2003-05-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Bribe-proof rules in the division problem (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:571.03

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