Forming Efficient Networks

David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein (wettstn@bgu.ac.il)

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Keywords: Networks; Implementation; Shapley Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7
Date: 2004-04-15
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Related works:
Working Paper: Forming Efficient Networks (2015)
Journal Article: Forming efficient networks (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:609.04

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