Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences

Marc Vorsatz

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Keywords: Approval Voting; Borda Count; Dichotomous Preferences; Social Choice Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2004-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:617.04

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