Employment by Lotto Revisited

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s conjectures concerning employment by lotto for general matching markets.

Keywords: employment by lotto; random mechanism; two-sided matching; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2004-10-25, Revised 2006-01-17
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Related works:
Journal Article: EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED (2009)
Working Paper: Employment by Lotto Revisited (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:627.04

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