The Informational Value of Incumbency

Carmen Bevi? () and Humberto Llavador
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carmen Bevia ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with- out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters informa- ion about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates di?erent from incumbency status, we pro- pose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection uccess. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideo- ogical and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the iterature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.

Keywords: Incumbency; information; candidate quality; selection bias; ideology. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2006-04-28
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2006/66206.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Informational Value of Incumbency (2015)
Journal Article: The Informational Value of Incumbency (2009)
Working Paper: The informational value of incumbency (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:662.06

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