Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents

Carmen Bevi? () and Luis C. Corch?n ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luis C. Corchon and Carmen Bevia ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and su cient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems.

Keywords: Cooperative production; sharing rules; sabotage. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D72 D78 J54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2006-04-28
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents (2006)
Working Paper: Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:663.06

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