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Weighted Approval Voting

Jordi Masso and Marc Vorsatz ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

Keywords: Approval Voting; Neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2006-09-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-knm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Weighted approval voting (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Weighted Approval Voting (2006) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06

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