Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting

Miguel Ballester and Pedro Rey-Biel

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter- natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this op- timal behaviour coincides with an intuitive and common definition of sincerity. For voting mechanisms allowing for multiple message types, such as approval vot- ing (AV), there exists no conclusive definition of sincerity in the literature. We show that for AV, voters' optimal strategy tends to one of the existent definitions of sincerity, consisting in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average of cardinal utilities.

Keywords: sincere and strategic voting; approval voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2007-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:675.07

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