Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development
Albert Banal-Estanol () and
Ines Macho-Stadler ()
UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher?s time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the ?skewing problem? would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.
Keywords: Faculty behaviour; basic vs. applied research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 L21 L31 M13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-sog
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Working Paper: Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development (2007)
Working Paper: Financial incentives in academia: research versus development (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:693.07
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