Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets
Javier Coronado (),
Sergi Jimenez-Martin () and
Pedro L. Marín
UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of multimarket contact on the behavior of pharmaceutical firms controlling for different levels of regulatory constraints using IMS MIDAS database. Theoretically, firms that meet in several markets are expected to be capable of sustaining implicitly more profitable out- comes, even if perfect monitoring is not possible. Firms may find it profitable to redistribute their market power among markets where they are operating. We present evidence for nine OECD countries with different degrees of regulation and show that regulation affects the importance of economic forces on firms' price setting behavior. Furthermore, our results confirms the presence of the predictions of the multimarket theory for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and less regulated ones (U.K., Germany, Netherlands), in contrast, for highly regulated countries (Japan, France, Italy and Spain) the results are less clear with some countries being
Keywords: Pharmaceutical prices; Multimarket Contact; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 L11 L13 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-20, Revised 2007-07-18
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Working Paper: Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets (2008)
Working Paper: Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets (2007)
Working Paper: Multimarket contact in pharmaceutical markets (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:698.07
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