A Model-to-Model Analysis of The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: Genetic Algorithms vs. Evolutionary Dynamics

Xavier Vilà

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the analytical model. Our main conclusion is that analytical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while on the one hand computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenar

Keywords: Agent-Based Computational Economics; Evolutionary Game Theory; Replicator Dynamics; Model-to-Model Analysis; Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2008-06-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cmp, nep-evo and nep-gth
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Related works:
Chapter: A Model-to-Model Analysis of the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma: Genetic Algorithms vs. Evolutionary Dynamics (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:747.08

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