The disadvantage of winning an election

Enriqueta Aragones and Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implica- tions of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

Keywords: Incumbency advantage; Referenda; Popular initiatives; Elections. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2010-03-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Disadvantage of Winning an Election (2015)
Working Paper: The disadvantage of winning an election (2010)
Working Paper: The disadvantage of winning an election (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:811.10

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