Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

Itai Ashlagi and Flip Klijn

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Keywords: matching; deferred acceptance; manipulability; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 2010-06-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (2012)
Working Paper: Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:835.10

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