Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation
Gastón Llanes () and
Stefano Trento ()
UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.
Keywords: Sequential Innovation; Patent Policy; Patent Pools; Anticommons; Double Marginalization; Complementary Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
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Journal Article: Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation (2012)
Working Paper: Patent Policy, Patent Pools, And The Accumulation Of Claims In Sequential Innovation (2010)
Working Paper: Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:856.10
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