Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

Effrosyni Diamantoudi (), Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Licun Xue ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

Keywords: externalities; cooperative game theory; Shapley value; linked issues. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2011-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues (2015)
Working Paper: Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:880.11

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