Evolution of Conventions in an Experimental Public Goods Game with Private and Public Knowledge of Advice

Ananish Chaudhuri () and Sara Graziano

No 201, Working Papers from Department of Economics, The University of Auckland

Abstract: We adopt an inter-generational approach to the public goods game where at the end of each session one generation of subjects leave advice for the succeeding generation via free form messages. Such advice can be private (advice left by one player in generation t is given only to her immediate successor in generation t+1) or public (advice left by players of generation t is made available to all members of generation t+1). We find that when advice is public it generates a process of social learning that helps increase contributions over time and also mitigates problems of free riding. Our results suggest that contrary to game theoretic predictions, communities may be able to achieve efficient or near efficient levels of public good provision on the basis of private contributions.

Keywords: Public goods; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:auc:wpaper:201

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