Endogenous Wage-Compliance and "Underground" Wages in Oligopoly

M. Vlassis

DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business

Abstract: This paper investigates whether compliance with sectoral wages, or "underground" wages (i.e. equilibrium wages lower than the, officially minimum, sectoral ones), may emerge endogenously in industries with market power. Wage bargaining is centralized and it is conducted by large-scale efficient firms and their own union. Small-scale inefficient firms are officially considered to be wage-takers.

Keywords: WAGES; BARGAINING; OLIGOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J50 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:0098-06

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