"Efficient Bargains" as a Wage-Compliance Device in Industries with Market Power

M. Vlassis

DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business

Abstract: This paper investigates if, and how, aternative bargaining agentas may sustain (or, emerge) endogenously, under conditions of centralized wage bargaining, in industries with market power. The wage & employment bargains agenta ("Efficient Bargains") is shown to be a strategic device to induce (weak) wage-compliance, used by large, technologically efficient firms; whenever there are incentives for wage-undercutting, on the part of small, labour-intensive firms.

Keywords: WAGES; OLIGOPOLIES; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J50 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:0099-02

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