The Cost of Ambiguity and Robustness in International Pollution Control
Anastasios Xepapadeas ()
No 1101, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
This paper examines robustness in international pollution control emerg- ing from the regulatorÃƒï¿½Ã¯Â¿Â½s concerns regarding possible misspeciÃƒï¿½Ã¯Â¿Â½cation of the natural system that is used to model pollution dynamics. Cooperative and noncooperative robust policy rules are determined along with the cost in terms of value loss of being robust relative to conventional policy rules.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Robustness; Precaution; DiÃ‚Â¤erential games; Open Loop and Feedback Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:1101
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