When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination
Irene Vlachaki () and
Sarantis Kalyvitis
No 1125, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
Abstract:
Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades, targeting, apart from development objectives, goals related to democracy. In this paper we investigate whether aid has affected the political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients. Because of data limitations, we cover the period 1967-2002. We find that aid flows decreased the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in a recipient country. This effect is sensitive to economic and social conditions. The negative relation between aid and democracy is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Aid from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the political regime of recipients.
Keywords: democratization; foreign aid; binary model; endogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 D70 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
Forthcoming in European Journal of Political Economy
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Journal Article: When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:1125
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