Dynamic modeling of pulse fishing: A game theoretic approach

George Halkos and George Papageorgiou

No 1324, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harvesting of renewable natural resources over time by one and several resource owners with conflicting interests. The traditional management model, dating back to Plourde (1970), is extended towards a two�state model in which harvesting equipment is treated as a stock variable. As a consequence of this extension, equilibrium dynamics with bifurcations and limit cycles occur. We also discuss conflicts as a game with two types of players involved: the traditional fishermen armed with the basic equipment and the heavy equipment users. Both players have a common depletion function, considered as harvesting, which is dependent together on personal effort and on intensity of equipment�s usage.

Keywords: Renewable resources; exploitation of natural resources; optimal control; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 Q32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-01
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Working Paper: Dynamic modeling of pulse fishing: A game theoretic approach (2013)
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