Tradable Emission Permits and Strategic Capital Taxation
Nikos Tsakiris (),
Panos Hatzipanayotou () and
Michael S. Michael ()
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Panos Hatzipanayotou: Athens University of Economics and Business
No 2201, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
In a model of two large asymmetric countries, we examine the effectiveness of the non-cooperative setting of tradable emission permits in reducing global pollution, under different rules of international taxation of capital earnings. Our key result is that, under certain conditions, the lowest Nash equilibrium level of global pollution is achieved when the policy-mix combines internationally, rather than nationally, tradable emission permits and either capital-tax exemptions or capital-tax credits.
Keywords: Emission Permits; Cross-border Pollution; Capital Tax Competition; Capital Tax Rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F18 F21 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Tradable Emission Permits and Strategic Capital Taxation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:2201
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